Orbán's defeat or victory for Ukraine. Why is EU summit historic?

Many were anticipating the arrival of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Thursday morning in Brussels. This was openly discussed by political leaders, including new Poland's Prime Minister, Donald Tusk. "Perhaps the meeting (with Zelenskyy) will take place tomorrow morning," he mysteriously announced. Zelenskyy himself was also awaiting this meeting.

He travelled to Norway exactly for this purpose the day before. He needed to spend his day somewhere after visiting the United States, which ended on Tuesday. There, in Norway, he stayed overnight and was ready to head to Brussels early in the morning as soon as he received confirmation from the President of the European Council, Charles Michel.

Even though the invitation from Brussels did not arrive, the Ukrainian leader remained prepared. Zelenskyy joined the EU summit online, sitting in a hall at a Norwegian airport. He emotionally warned EU leaders that their indecision would be a victory for Putin.

The President did not return to Ukraine but headed to Frankfurt on an unplanned and entirely optional visit, just to be near Belgium and be able to be there within an hour if Charles Michel invites Zelenskyy for the negotiations at some point. The stakes at the summit were so high that other tasks of the Ukrainian leader took a back seat. The summit brought Ukraine an unconditional victory, unexpectedly.

The EU was already prepared to make concessions to Hungary, but it was unnecessary: after a closed-door conversation with Scholz and Macron and after a brief discussion in the meeting hall, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban suddenly abandoned his threats. He allowed his colleagues to bypass the Hungarian veto and practically agreed to the start of EU accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova. "There are no grounds to negotiate Ukraine's membership," the Prime Minister of Hungary repeated several times at the entrance to the European Council building, where journalists gathered on Thursday morning in anticipation of the European Council meeting.

He was awaited for a meeting, or rather, a working breakfast with the leaders of Germany and France, Olaf Scholz and Emmanuel Macron, as well as two top EU officials - Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen. The four most influential EU leaders invited Orban at the last moment to convince him to change his position on Ukraine without unnecessary witnesses. Although top diplomats involved in organising this conversation were sceptical about its success the day before.

Orban did everything literally to rule out the possibility of a turnaround

and "cement" his intention to veto the decision to start negotiations on Ukraine's EU accession. A few days before the summit, he publicly and repeatedly promised to veto Ukraine. Orban publicly refused to consider the arguments of Ukrainian Hungarians that Ukraine had fulfiled all commitments regarding language legislation, which had been a shield for attacks on Ukraine for many years.

On the day of departure to Brussels, he convened a session of the Hungarian parliament, where he detailed, with numbers and presentations, told MPs that the start of EU accession negotiations with Ukraine would be an unconditional disaster for Hungary, and therefore, he was obligated to veto it. Such actions by the Hungarian Prime Minister looked no longer like "bargaining." While Orban was having breakfast with the European Quartet, other Western leaders and diplomats were considering what to do with the seemingly unbreakable Hungarian veto.

Some even shared alternative scenarios with journalists, each of which meant that Ukraine's practical path to membership was delayed, and the window of opportunities was closing. But even capitals friendly to Kyiv were ready to say "yes" to these alternatives if it turned out that Orban did not compromise. But the Hungarian leader surprised everyone again.

Orban simply left the room during the EU enlargement vote. As claimed, Olaf Scholz (yes, the same one Orban had breakfast with) suggested to him, "Go have a coffee" and not interfere with others voting. The Hungarian immediately agreed, as if this scenario had been prearranged.

The mechanism of "non-voting," when one or more countries consciously abstain from supporting a decision but also do not apply a veto, is not uncommon in EU history. The situation where a country leader is practically shown the door at the summit so that he does not veto an unacceptable decision for himself is unprecedented.

This step for Orban was undoubtedly humiliating. He had to come up later with a clumsy, unconvincing version for the Hungarian audience that the decision was so bad that Hungary "could not participate in it," and that's why he walked out instead of vetoing the "bad" decision.

Then he had to face mocking comments from colleagues, such as the Belgian Prime Minister advising Orban to "keep his mouth shut" when he had already abandoned the veto. What made Orban betray his initial intentions? It is unknown which arguments during the meeting with the European Quartet leaders were the most convincing for Orban.

It is also speculated that calls from across the Atlantics, from influential representatives of the Republican Party, which Orban treats with special romance, may have influenced the Hungarian leader. It cannot be ruled out that Viktor Orban, who respects and fears power in international politics and practically never fights "one against all," simply gave in under the pressure of the rest of the member states. After all, he could have hoped that he would not be blocking Ukraine alone.

Yes, Austria declared its intention not to support negotiations with Ukraine until the last day. However, Austrians withdrew their objections at the summit. Orban also counted on the support of Slovak leader Robert Fico, but he too supported Ukraine's move towards EU membership.

Orban was left alone. Considering that he had no rational arguments against starting negotiations, Orban essentially lost this negotiation battle. Finally, sources in Brussels assert with certainty that the vote for Ukraine was not "Orban's payment" for unlocking EUR10 billion in euro funds for Hungary.

It was not about money this time, or at least it was not such an obvious "deal." However, talking about money is worth a separate discussion. After accession negotiations with Ukraine was resolved, the summit moved on to financial matters.

Reaching an agreement here has proved to be more challenging. The discussion lasted until deep into the night. Leaders only began to get free at around 3 AM, without achieving the desired result.

Orban vetoed a large package of financial decisions, including financial assistance to Ukraine. The money is from the Ukraine Facility programme amounting to 50 billion euros for four years to cover the budget deficit and assisting Ukraine in financing its armed forces. From this description, as well as from the headlines, it may look like a disaster.

Orban has vetoed a decision that would allow the Ukrainian armed forces to maintain their capability. This is not the case! The Hungarian veto is unpleasant, but it will not be too painful for Ukraine this time.

Orban's veto is likely to be overcome ine early January.

Mechanisms for this exist within the EU. The key agreement reached by the leaders at the overnight summit is the decision to convene a new emergency EU summit in early January dedicated exclusively to this financial package. European government leaders are already openly saying that they are practically sure Orban will compromise.

Firstly, the decision on EU financial matters can be made even without the Hungarian vote. It will be procedurally imperfect but still legitimate. The EU is prepared for this, as openly stated by the President of the European Council. The decision on financing Ukraine is already there. The only question is how to formalise it.

Secondly, according to rumours, the thawing of the Hungarian 10 billion euros was specifically aimed at obtaining the Hungarian vote for money for Ukraine. The chance that Orban will approve the allocation of funds in January is very high. Orban has stopped denying the possibility of assistance to Ukraine after the summit. So why veto now?

Orban could not return from Brussels without at least some, even fake, "victory." He ruined his public promises to block Ukraine's progress toward the EU. He did not block the new 12th sanctions package. He supported the decision to start developing a new package of sanctions.

He had to veto something related to Ukraine. But the systemic problem of the Hungarian veto has not disappeared. The EU's decision to open negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova is a political step of utmost importance.

It was adopted in its initial form, without any concessions compared to what the European Commission proposed. Yes, the European Commission can now begin technical preparations for negotiations in December. In March 2024, according to the just-adopted summit decision, Ukraine awaits the "intergovernmental conference" - a body that will approve the negotiating framework and make other technical decisions.

The speed is unprecedented in the history of EU enlargement for any candidate country. Simply, one could even say that we have passed the political point of no return on the path to membership. If Ukraine implements the necessary reforms and adheres to EU law now, it should be granted membership.

The question is only when it will happen.

In practice, Hungary retains the ability to throw a wrench into the works almost daily. The accession process is structured in such a way that even intermediate technical decisions, not to mention major ones like the intergovernmental conference on the negotiating framework, must be adopted unanimously. Orban has already calculated that they can stop Ukraine 75 more times if necessary.

Kyiv needs to be aware of this. It means negotiating with Orban. If journalists or experts can speak about the Hungarian authoritarian leader and the undemocratic government in Budapest as they deserve, the Ukrainian government is deprived of this privilege.

Moreover, Kyiv must now avoid a very real and probable mistake: having achieved an unconditional victory at the summit, Zelenskyy's team may postpone the Hungarian issue as "no longer urgent" and "temporarily resolved." And that's not the case. Now is the time to try to push the negotiations between the leaders of Ukraine and Hungary. To show that we did not seek to humiliate him in Brussels, but, on the contrary, are open to dialogue.

To try to reach an agreement, establish contact with Budapest. Because sooner or later, this path will have to be taken. The future EU accession, which has become a reality, offers no other option.

By Sergiy Sydorenko, 

Editor, European Pravda, from Brussels

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