NATO is inevitable: What the Washington summit's decision means for Ukraine's membership
It could have been refined, first-class trolling of Viktor Orban on the part of the American administration, but more likely, it was a symbolic, yet accidental coincidence. The leaders of Ukraine and Hungary, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Viktor Orban, along with their teams, were housed in the same hotel in Washington, close to the White House. In Washington, where the NATO summit is currently taking place and where leaders and delegations from about 40 countries have gathered, Hungarian diplomats had to work alongside their Ukrainian colleagues for two days and put up with the Ukrainian leader being at close quarters.
Although it wasn't their choice: the hotels for the invited heads of state and government had been selected by the US. Something similar happened at the NATO summit itself. Hungary, which in recent years has followed a pro-Russian agenda and blocked Ukraine's movement toward NATO, was eventually forced to comply and agree to a decision that made Ukraine's accession irreversible.
Advertisement: This decision was agreed upon in the last few days before the summit. Previously, the US had responded with a flat "no" to such a proposal.
This suddenness of the decision ultimately helped: the resistance of players promoting Russian ideas was too late. And Ukraine's partners and supporters in the Alliance gained a degree of leverage they could not have hoped for, and which will be useful, given the expected return of Donald Trump to power in the US. However, the summit did not achieve a similar breakthrough in terms of funding for Ukraine's Armed Forces.
The Alliance's decision was positive for Ukraine, but it has left much more uncertainty. The main bureaucratic confrontations over the issue are still yet to take place.
Restoring irreversibility
The 2024 NATO Summit in Washington, unlike last year's meeting in Vilnius, did not focus on Ukraine. Or at least the leadership of both the Alliance and the host country were eager to avoid the "Ukrainisation" of the leaders' meeting.
This summit had an electoral significance for President Biden. So it was important to avoid conflicts and public disputes, including from Ukraine. To prevent Ukraine from feeling slighted, they were offered a "bridge to NATO" formula, which offered little more than had been agreed in Vilnius.
The only significant amendment was NATO's declaration that the process of starting the process for Ukraine's accession to the Alliance must be started "urgent" if and when the conditions for this are met. Kyiv conveyed to Brussels that although Ukraine continues to believe it deserves more, it would not stage a protest this time.
Everyone agreed to maintain the status quo. Although Ukraine was informed of the decisions, it did not participate in the discussion.
The approach to relations with partners is an internal matter for NATO, so the decisions were made solely by the allies. Friends of Ukraine proposed in the early stages of discussions that the Alliance go beyond the Vilnius framework and add a stronger phrase than a "bridge to NATO" stating that Ukraine's path to membership is an "irreversible" process. However, the US immediately opposed this with a fairly logical argument: how can we give any guarantees when Ukraine itself has proven in the past its ability to abandon the Euro-Atlantic goal?
After all, this happened under Yanukovych! And although the negotiations continued, it seemed that this argument was unchallengeable. However, news arrived from Washington about a sudden 180-degree change in the US position a few days before the summit.
So "irreversibility" returned to the text of the decision, albeit in a wording that was slightly different to what Ukraine's friends had initially proposed. Thus, this paragraph of the Summit decision begins with the ambitious but decisive statement "Ukraine's future lies in NATO", followed by a specific commitment: "As Ukraine continues this vital work [meeting the conditions for membership],
we will continue to support it on its irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership. We reaffirm that we will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when the Allies agree and conditions are met."
We will return to the mention of "irreversibility" as it deserves special attention. Meanwhile the fact that it refers to full membership is important, ensuring that a weaker formulation can't emerge at a later date in the dialogue between Ukraine and the Alliance. And of course the fact that the US under President Biden returned to statements about membership was important.
It is no secret that the current US leader is a sceptic. Essentially, the summit decision, ultimately supported personally by Biden, nullified his scandalous statement that "Ukraine is not in NATO". And the episode with Biden clearly illustrates how the new provision will work.
A solution for Trump and Putin
The decision made in Washington has marked another point of no return in Ukraine's NATO integration. Ukraine's aspiration to become an Alliance member does not need extra proof.
All public opinion polls confirm this. Ultimately, it is enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine. However, for many Western partners, this has not yet been an axiom.
This includes the United States, where many players believed that Ukraine's NATO membership should become a "bargaining chip" in negotiations with Putin to end the war. This is believed to be the reason behind Biden's aforementioned controversial statement. However, this path now becomes practically unrealistic.
Readers might wonder: couldn't Trump "throw out" the summit decision on Ukraine and issue an ultimatum demanding Ukraine abandon its future in the Alliance? The short answer is: no, it's almost impossible. Theoretically, it is possible, but in practice, it will be extremely difficult to do after the Washington summit decision.
Despite the full power of the US president, he cannot arbitrarily change the country's policy.
The US leader would at least need Congress's consent. The American parliament is currently on Ukraine's side, as is the State Department. This is why Biden had to compromise on Ukraine's membership.
The NATO decision also sends a signal to Putin that the Alliance's intention regarding Ukraine's membership is entirely serious. It is not a formality. Even if Russia someday becomes ready to negotiate the terms of ending the war, the package of agreements is unlikely to include Ukraine's renunciation of full NATO membership.
Because revising Alliance policy requires a consensus, which will be difficult to achieve. When the White House and Biden personally approved this wording, he surely understood all the consequences. What convinced the US president, what made him change his approach to Ukraine's NATO membership?
The question remains open, but it is highly likely that Biden eventually gave in under pressure from European allies. Indeed, almost all countries, including those far from Ukraine, welcomed the agreement on the "irreversibility" formula in Washington. For Europeans, this is a matter of their security, ensuring that even after the war ends, Russian aggression does not recur.
"Although the conditions for Ukraine's NATO membership are probably not yet defined, we can now say that this membership is irreversible. It will definitely happen. And it is important that these are two parallel paths - NATO and EU enlargement," explained Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez on Wednesday.
Interestingly, the Lithuanians, who did not hide their disappointment with last year's summit decision, are finally satisfied. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis admitted that by including "irreversibility" in the text, another widely publicised Alliance formula, the "bridge to membership," has lost its meaning. It was intended to cover up the fact that NATO had no better working initiatives. "The situation was such that we had to tell Ukraine something.
That's how the 'bridge' appeared. But the main thing is the goal - NATO membership. It may take time, it may require reforms, but throughout the process, there will be an understanding that it is about Ukraine's membership in NATO," he explained.
Were there those who opposed the bold formulation? Yes, certainly. And surprisingly, it was not Hungary.
In the relationship between Kyiv and Budapest, there has been a noticeable warming, possibly making Orban less categorical. However, according to one of European Pravda's sources, the ambitious wording angered Slovakia, represented at the summit by President Peter Pellegrini. Nevertheless, since the decision was made, it is evident that no veto was applied.
There were also clear protests from Western experts. An open letter of protest signed by dozens of specialists, including those known for promoting Russian narratives, made some buzz. But it had no chance of influencing anything since the summit's declaration had been agreed upon by the time it was published.
It is likely that the positive role was played by the fact that the key points for Ukraine in the summit decision appeared at the last moment, making it nearly impossible to change anything. Ironically, the story of the Vilnius summit essentially repeated itself, but in reverse: if last year, the leaders reached an agreement at the last moment on very unfavourable wording for Ukraine that Kyiv could not change, now the opposite has happened.
Funding for weapons
Another block of the Washington decision concerning Ukraine relates to financing. The outcome leaves much more uncertainty.
At first glance, everything sounds very positive: the NATO summit has agreed on a plan to fund Ukraine's defence for 2025, and Alliance members unanimously committed that Ukraine would receive "basic funding of at least 40 billion euros over the next year." NATO declares the goal of building the Ukrainian Armed Forces so that Ukraine gains "the ability to defeat Russian aggression and deter it in the future." The funding amount is documented only for 2025. However, the decision repeatedly stresses that it is about long-term support - with subsequent financial commitments to be determined additionally at the 2025, 2026 summits, and so on.
The Alliance has also separately signed and unanimously agreed on a document called the "Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine." To be precise, "almost unanimously." One state immediately declared that it would not participate in security assistance to Ukraine - and, of course, this is Hungary.
However, Budapest did not veto this decision and immediately informed its allies that it would simply remain on the sidelines. So the scheme "Mr. Orban, would you like to go out for a coffee while we decide on Ukraine?" continues to work effectively.
Given Hungary's history of vetoes in the Alliance, this option seems acceptable to everyone. The rest of the countries agreed that the 40 billion euros coverage would include: - Procurement of military equipment for Ukraine;
- Free transfer of weapons and other equipment; - Maintenance and logistics costs of military equipment for Ukraine; - Costs of training Ukrainian defence forces;
- Operational costs associated with providing military support to Ukraine; - Investments in Ukraine's defence infrastructure and defence industry; - Contributions to NATO trust funds for Ukraine.
The real problem
The agreement on the amount of aid for 2025 does not include the main thing: the distribution of money between countries.
It seems that the only agreement reached, albeit unofficially, is the 50/50 split of expenses between the US and the rest of NATO members. How this amount will be divided among the "rest" and what will happen in case of problems with the American component remains an open question. The distribution of the burden among European countries is a separate issue.
The Secretary-General aimed to establish a strict dependency: each country allocates a share for the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) proportional to its GDP. This approach was lobbied by key defence donors like Germany, which is currently spending disproportionately more than other countries. However, these "others" were not keen on increasing their contributions.
For instance, Italy stated it would not agree to proportional funding. Eventually, Stoltenberg managed to push through a formula that references GDP but does not impose strict obligations: "Allies are expected to provide such assistance through proportional contributions based on their GDP, which will also take into account bilateral, multilateral or other arrangements with Ukraine." How to enforce this and achieve the 40 billion target despite some countries likely continuing to pay less remains an open question.
This task will have to be addressed by the new NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte and, likely, the new US President. There are positive expectations within the Alliance, with reminders that the 2% GDP defence spending norm is also not legally binding. However, public and political pressure from Washington (and in this case, also Berlin) allows for achieving results.
Therefore, funds for Ukraine should also be available. Sergiy Sydorenko, Editor, European Pravda
From Washington
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