Ukrainian forces achieve operational surprise with their actions in Russia's Kursk Oblast – ISW

Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) have suggested that the lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk Oblast and the speed of the advance indicate that Ukrainian troops were able to achieve operational surprise. Source: ISW Details: The Ukrainian cross-border mechanised offensive in Russia's Kursk Oblast, which began on 6 August, continues as part of Ukraine's operational efforts on Russian territory.

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Quote: "ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security."

Details: It is highlighted that the Kremlin is almost certain to make efforts to reclaim the Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have taken, with the aim of curbing Ukrainian activities. A significant Ukrainian advance further into Russian territory would represent a substantial strategic setback for Russian leader Vladimir Putin, undermining his long-standing narrative of "Russian stability, security, and geopolitical resurgence". The ISW has indicated that if Russian reports regarding the situation in Kursk Oblast are accurate, and if the Russian military command perceives the situation as depicted by Russian sources, they have several potential courses of action (COAs) available to them in response to the Ukrainian operation in the region.

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The possible responses include:

  • COA (Course of Action) 1: The Russian military command may decide to use existing conscripts, Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia, and other irregular forces already deployed to the international border area to push Ukrainian forces back and defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.
  • COA 2: The Russian military command may decide to use the existing Northern Grouping of Forces deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian border to respond to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk Oblast.
  • COA 3: The Russian military command may choose to redeploy operational reserves that it accumulated for its planned Summer 2024 offensive effort and/or relatively better provisioned and more combat-effective frontline units to Kursk Oblast from elsewhere in the theater.
  • COA 4: The Russian military command may seek to maintain the forces it currently has committed to Kursk Oblast but could redeploy significant aviation and strike elements to the area in an effort to improve Russia's ability to retake territory.

Quote: "Putin likely assesses that he must respond to the perceived threat to civilians in order to assure the Russian public that the situation is under control and avoid significant domestic discontent."

More details: It is noted in the review that Ukrainian officials have not yet commented directly on the ongoing operation in Kursk Oblast. On 8 August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Russia "brought war to Ukraine" and should "feel what it has done" in response. Quote: "The lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported rate of Ukrainian advance indicates that Ukrainian forces were able to achieve operational surprise along the border with Russia.

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have struggled to achieve operational surprise in the past year and a half of fighting due to the partially transparent battlefield in Ukraine.  Ukraine's ability to achieve operational surprise highlights that the widespread visual and sensor-based transparency that both sides have established does not translate into a fully transparent battlefield, however, and that the belligerents in Ukraine can leverage ambiguity around operational intent to achieve operational surprise." More details: Analysts pointed out that ISW had already assessed that Russian forces had failed to learn the lessons of the difficulties of mechanised manoeuvres on the supposedly transparent battlefield of Ukraine.

However, given its ability to achieve apparent operational surprise in this case, Ukraine appears to be learning and adapting to this aspect of the battlefield. To quote the ISW's Key Takeaways on 8 August:

  • Ukrainian cross-border mechanised offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that began on 6 August are continuing as part of a Ukrainian operational effort within Russian territory. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security.
  • Geolocated footage and Russian claims indicate that Ukrainian forces continued rapid advances further into Kursk Oblast on 8 August, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly present in areas as far as 35 kilometers from the international border with Sumy Oblast.

    Ukrainian forces most certainly do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, however.

  • The Kremlin will almost certainly endeavor to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized and stop Ukrainian activity further into Russia, as substantial Ukrainian advances within Russia would be a strategic blow to Russian leader Vladimir Putin's decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability, security, and geopolitical resurgence.
  • The lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported rate of Ukrainian advance indicates that Ukrainian forces were able to achieve operational surprise along the border with Russia.
  • Ukrainian officials have yet to comment directly on Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast.
  • US officials noted that Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast is not a violation of US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia's border areas. 

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