Forcible reintegration of Moldova: potential causes and consequences of rapid Transnistrian regime fall
There are probably no two almost identical international armed conflicts, "hot" or "frozen." Every war has its unique features, and attempts to draw parallels between two different conflicts often lead to incorrect conclusions, even when the aggressor state in both conflicts is the same. The war against Ukraine and the long-standing Transnistrian conflict illustrate this point in a perfect way. Almost everything differs between the two, with the only common factor being that both Ukraine and Moldova have their territories occupied by Russia.
However, for many, this similarity is sufficient. From time to time, public calls are heard from Ukrainian opinion leaders for a military operation in Transnistria that would destroy the Russian military stationed there and force the separatist region to reintegrate, i.e., come under the control of Moldova's constitutional government. In their view, this would eliminate a source of instability on Ukraine's western border.
At the same time, Ukrainian international relations experts unanimously oppose this idea. They argue that it does not take into account the differences between Moldova and Ukraine. Moreover, if Kyiv actually decides to resolve the Transnistrian issue using the Ukrainian Armed Forces, it will have extremely negative consequences for Ukraine itself.
In addition, instead of a stable pro-Western Moldova, we might achieve the opposite effect. Advertisement: Moldova also opposes such a scenario, and without its consent, Ukraine could find itself in the role of an aggressor.
This scenario cannot be completely ruled out though. For instance, in the event of military provocations by Russian forces from Transnistria, Ukraine would have the right to respond without waiting for Chi?in?u's permission. Furthermore, a military operation by Ukraine's Armed Forces is not the only option.
There are also scenarios for the forced reunification of Moldova, which would not involve military action on its territory. Nevertheless, all these scenarios will have shocking consequences that must be recognised and considered.
Important details of the conflict
Before proceeding to specific scenarios, it is necessary to recall the uniqueness of Transnistria, which will determine the consequences and the feasibility of a military scenario. Transnistria is a region located mainly on the left bank of the Dniester River.
This is part of the internationally recognised territory of Moldova, which remains outside the control of the country's constitutional authorities. The "independence" of this territory is not recognised by any UN member state, not even Russia. On the territory of Transnistria, the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRV), a component of the regular army of the Russian Federation, is stationed without the permission of Moldova.
International law recognises that Transnistria is under the effective control of the Russian Federation. This status was first announced by the European Court of Human Rights in 2004 and since then repeatedly confirmed by other decisions of the ECHR and political bodies of the Council of Europe. In PACE decisions, Transnistria is also called a territory under Russian occupation. However, the European Union refrains from such specification.
The Transnistrian conflict has a number of unique features. There is no strong sense of unity with the occupied territory in Moldovan society. Public opinion polls have never shown that the return of Transnistria is a priority for the citizens of Moldova, recently it is not even in the top 10 urgent problems of the country.
Why so? One of the key reasons is that Transnistria broke away from the control of Chi?in?u back during the Soviet Union era, in 1990. In 1991, when Moldova declared independence and the left-bank regions of the Dniester were legally incorporated into its territory, Transnistria was already de facto out of its control.
An additional reason for the lack of public demand for the reintegration of Transnistria into Moldova is the painful experience of 1992. Chi?in?u attempted back then to regain control of the region by force, but it faced the Russian army stationed there. The short but bloody conflict claimed over 1,000 lives.
Moldova lost that war. This experience makes any military scenario highly unfeasible.
Another characteristic of the conflict on the Dniester is that, from the beginning, it lacked a societal basis. There are no religious, national or any other differences between the residents of the right and left banks of Dniester.
Before the war, Moldovans were the largest ethnic group in the Transnistrian region, with a slight majority over Russians and Ukrainians. There is also no historical basis for the region's "independence." It was a conflict of elites, a conflict over control and funding.
The driving force behind it was the party leadership and heads of state enterprises in Tiraspol (including defence factories) - mostly people without Moldovan roots. The reasons for confrontation of Tiraspol with the rest of Moldova were artificially created using the Soviet disinformation machine and state-controlled media, which persists in Transnistria today. Nevertheless, despite all efforts and over 30 years of "brainwashing," no enmity has emerged between the left and right banks of the Dniester.
People did not see, and still do not see, each other as enemies. At the same time, there has been little rapprochement between the two banks of the Dniester. The attitude of most people towards life and those on the opposite bank can rather be described as "indifference." The vast majority of Transnistrian residents have obtained Moldovan citizenship, but they see it not as a form of self-identification, but as a tool (for example, for travel).
All these details are crucial for understanding the potential reaction of people in the event of a military scenario.
Arguments in favour of a military scenario
Calls for a military operation in Transnistria have been heard in the Ukrainian media since the spring of 2022. Immediately after the Armed Forces of Ukraine pushed Russian troops back from the outskirts of Kyiv and other Northern regions, voices emerged advocating for a new swift victory that could be achieved in Transnistria. The scenario sounds simple and appealing.
Since Russian troops of the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRV) are stationed in Transnistria, they are proposed to be recognised as a legitimate military target. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have superior strength and a strong chance of victory in this local war. Supporters of a military scenario in Transnistria believe that its implementation would lead to:
- the elimination of military threats on Ukraine's southwestern border and the need for Ukraine to maintain a small military presence in that area;
- access for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to ammunition depots in Transnistria for use in the war against Russia;
- the capture of Russian soldiers, which would increase the exchange pool for returning Ukrainian prisoners of war from Russia;
- an end to the long-standing instability in Moldova caused by the presence of the occupied territory, leading to a more pro-Western orientation for Moldova;
From a purely military point of view, this idea makes sense.
The military strength of the Russian army and its proxies in Transnistria is limited and cannot be replenished due to the lack of supply routes from Russia. The region also lacks nomenclature of weapons OR modern weaponry, as well as contemporary electronic warfare and air defence systems. The Russian army and their proxies in the occupied part of Moldova are armed with light armoured vehicles, primarily APCs and BRDM-2s, anti-tank guns and mortars.
There is also some offensive weaponry, such as T-64 tanks and a certain number of Grad multiple rocket launchers. Nevertheless, the combat readiness of this equipment, as well as the effectiveness of personnel, is highly questionable. It is also important to note that the potential defence of Transnistria would face a serious issue in terms of mobilising manpower. Unlike the civil and financial management in Transnistria, which has a de facto high level of autonomy, Russia retains control over all relevant security structures in the region.
Therefore, in a crisis situation, Russia would fully take over the management not only of the Operational Group of Russian Forces and Russian "peacekeepers" (up to 2,000 personnel) but also of the so-called Transnistrian army (around 5,000 personnel) and the so-called Ministry of State Security (over 3,000 personnel, according to estimates from Chi?in?u), among others. However, this does not mean that Russia has up to 10,000 soldiers and officers ready to defend the "republic." In fact, the majority of personnel in the Operational Group of Russian Forces are not military personnel from Russia but local Transnistrians. They make up 100% of the rank-and-file and sergeant staff and most of the lower officer ranks.
Official Chi?in?u believes that there are only a few dozen military personnel deployed from Russia. For many in this depressed region, serving in the Russian army is one of the few sources of income. They did not join the military to fight.
Any attempts to carry out a general mobilisation in Transnistria are doomed to failure. This step can only lead to a mass flight to the right bank of Transnistrians who do not want to fight. Does this mean that Transnistria would immediately capitulate in the event of a confrontation with the Ukrainian Armed Forces?
No. The regular Russian officers and FSB representatives integrated into the security forces of Transnistria, as well as a certain number of ideological supporters of the "Russian world" among the rank-and-file, would still pose a threat. Therefore, there is a risk of urban combat in Tiraspol, Tighina, Bender and R?bni?a.
Why would a military scenario harm Ukraine?
Military reasoning does not take into account the political realities and international consequences.
The presence of Russian troops in the region does not change this.. In a situation where it is crucial for Ukraine to maintain the unity of global players regarding the unacceptability of Russian aggression, such a step would be very risky and would undoubtedly be used by Kyiv's opponents on the international stage. Many in Ukraine expect that Moldova itself will ask Ukraine for a military operation to resolve the conflict and return Transnistria.
However, this is a deeply flawed assumption. First, there is a broad consensus in Moldova about the inadmissibility of a military scenario. Secondly, the parliament also holds powers in the defence sector, and approving such a decision would require more than 50% of political "suicides." This is unrealistic.
Lastly, and most importantly, if the Ukrainian Armed Forces were to carry out a military operation to eliminate Transnistria, the outcome could turn out to be the opposite of what is expected. For Ukraine, it is important to have a pro-Western Moldova that is moving towards EU membership next to it. Nonetheless, a military operation by the Ukrainian Armed Forces would primarily strike at the pro-European government of Moldova, which is facing declining approval ratings ahead of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024-2025.
President Sandu, lacking economic achievements, has built her campaign around the idea that her team has "maintained peace in the country." Transferring the war onto Moldovan territory would undermine this narrative, linking the European vector to conflict and potentially bringing a pro-Russian government to power in 2025.
This would run counter to Ukraine's interests. Still, can we rule out the war in Transnistria? No.
There is a theoretical possibility that Transnistria could provoke the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Moreover, it seems that Kyiv does not rule out a limited operation to capture Russian military depots in the village of Cobasna.
Armament composition: a formula with many unknowns
In Transnistria, near the village of Cobasna, 2 km from the Ukrainian border, there are ammunition depots built during the Soviet Union. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Warsaw Pact countries - Germany, Poland, etc. - Soviet stocks from these countries were moved here, which is why the facility in Cobasna is often called "the largest ammunition warehouse in Eastern Europe", although it is impossible to verify whether this statement is correct.
In view of the ammunition starvation of the Armed Forces, the idea of a limited military operation to take control of the warehouses in Cobasna has considerable support, since it will have much less negative international consequences for Ukraine, and also excludes the humanitarian consequences that the occupation of Tiraspol and possible street fighting with its defenders. Nevertheless, the success of the operation in Cobasna is far from guaranteed. Firstly, it is crucial to ensure that when the Armed Forces of Ukraine gain control over the warehouses, uncontrolled detonation of ammunition doesn't happen.
It is impossible to rule out such sabotage by the Russians, who currently control these warehouses. Several sources in the Moldovan leadership believe that the Russians are preparing for a possible military scenario and have a plan to blow up the warehouses if they lose control over them. Secondly, it is known for sure that the quantity of ammunition is significantly lower than the stocks from 30 years ago.
In 1999, Russia agreed at the Istanbul OSCE summit to withdraw weapons and troops from Transnistria and began to implement this promise, expert Artem Filipenko recalls. By 2003, Russia had exported 721 wagonloads of ammunition from Cobasna. On 26-27 December 2003, all the anti-aircraft missiles stored there since the Soviet era were removed via military transport aircraft Il-76.
According to data reported to the OSCE back then, there were 20,887 tonnes of ammunition stored in the warehouses of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Tiraspol, out of an initial 42,000 tonnes, that is, about half. Not everything was to be exported. A significant part of the ammunition in Cobasna was too old to be transported, and it was to be disposed of on-site.
Still, it is unknown how much usable ammunition remains and which specific types. Nevertheless, it is clear that during the removal more than 20 years ago, the Russians prioritised the evacuation of the most valuable items.
The gas factor
Transnistria is a narrow strip of land without natural resources or a cohesive logistical system. Even with international recognition, Transnistria would likely have little chance of economic success.
As an unrecognised entity with restricted international trade, it was inherently economically unsustainable. Over the past 30 years, circumstances have only worsened due to the aging of the region's population, the departure of young people from the unpromising region, the lack of modernisation of production infrastructure, shifts in geostrategic conditions, rising energy costs, the aging of housing stock and existing infrastructure, etc. Given these factors, the persistence of the Transnistrian administration and the survival of its economy may seem miraculous.
However, in reality, Russia played the role of "a magician" all this time. Initially, Russia purchased Transnistrian products, including dual-use goods. Nevertheless, over time, this factor became less significant.
After Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014, its importance sharply declined, and today it can almost be disregarded altogether. Russia also funded its contingent in Tiraspol, provided additional payments to Transnistrian pensioners, and so on. Nonetheless, even these financial injections have shown a long-term trend of decline.
In recent years, the key source of funding for Transnistria has been gas donations. Gazprom has supplied gas to the region free of charge for many years, formally attributing the debt to Moldova, which has never officially recognised this debt and certainly will not repay it. A smaller portion of this "free" gas is sold by the Transnistrian authorities to household and commercial consumers, as well as to municipal enterprises in the region, with the revenue flowing into the separatist administration's budget.
The price of gas for Transnistrians is lower than the market rate, creating a sense of well-being and social security in the region while also giving local businesses a competitive advantage. However, the bulk of the gas from Russia is burned at the Moldavskaya GRES (Cuciurgan power station), a thermal power plant in the town of Dnestrovsk. Electricity from there is supplied to citizens and businesses in the region and "exported" to Chi?in?u.
Transnistrian electricity makes up the lion's share of Moldova's energy balance. The revenues from electricity and gas sales form the backbone of the Transnistrian budget, and the availability of gas, electricity and heating at preferential rates is the foundation of social security in Transnistria.
In essence, the existence of the separatist regime is sustained by Russian gas. But let's face the truth: sooner or later, this source will disappear.
The end of free gas
It's important to remember that gas supply to Transnistria is delivered across Ukraine, where the war is ongoing.
What if one day military actions result in damage to the gas transmission system, making it impossible to supply gas to the Moldavskaya GRES (Cuciurgan power station)? Several gas pipelines enter Moldova (including Transnistria) from Ukraine, which in normal circumstances guarantees reliable supply. Nonetheless, the separatist region receives exclusively gas from Gazprom, and since 2022, it has been supplied via only one route - through the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhhorod pipeline with an entry point at Sudzha.
Currently, the city of Sudzha in Kursk Oblast of Russia is under Ukraine's control. The Russian army is actively conducting airstrikes in the area, which significantly raises the risk of damage or destruction to the gas metering station. Nearby, in Ukraine's Sumy region, which also faces heavy shellings, there is a compressor station.
If this station is damaged, gas transit will stop until repairs are made. In addition to technical risks, there are organisational ones. At the end of 2024, the gas transit contract between Gazprom and Naftogaz expires.
The Ukrainian company is determined not to enter into any new direct contracts with Gazprom, and no other supplier would agree to provide gas for free. Moreover, the possibility of a contract between Naftogaz and Tiraspoltransgas or other Transnistrian entities is highly unlikely. Moldova also excludes itself from acting as a guarantor in any new contract.
The contract could be facilitated through intermediaries, but this would reduce the reliability of gas supply. The search for ways to ensure the delivery of "free" gas from Gazprom to Transnistria is ongoing. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that on 1 January 2025, or later, the supply of free gas to Transnistria will end, and with it, the financial foundation of the separatist region may collapse.
If Moldova's reintegration is achieved by other means (whether through negotiations or the use of force), Gazprom's gas donations will also cease, as Russia will have no incentive to subsidize a territory over which it has lost control. The only question is when this will happen. The Moldavskaya GRES (Cuciurgan power station) can operate on coal, with enough reserves to last for 10 weeks of limited operation, supplying electricity only to Transnistria, with no export.
A small amount of gas could be provided by the right-bank Moldova to maintain residential heating in Transnistria and prevent a humanitarian crisis. However, this would only be a temporary solution. At the same time, revenue from electricity exports to Transnistria's budget would stop immediately.
This scenario would have tectonic consequences and would likely lead to a humanitarian crisis in the region, resulting in the kind of "chaotic" reintegration of Moldova that was previously discussed. However, these challenges are not insurmountable and could be significantly mitigated with Western financial assistance.
Gas scenarios and risks of forced reintegration
What will happen if gas subsidies stop? If gas subsidies were to cease, most likely that Transnistria will still be under the control of the de facto authorities in Tiraspol.
This means that the region would not be occupied by Ukrainian Armed Forces nor undergoing a transfer of control to Chi?in?u through reintegration negotiations.
The immediate consequence would be the collapse of the de facto administration's public budget. This collapse would be unfixable through any austerity measures because most revenue would disappear, while new expenses would arise from dealing with the emerging crises. The humanitarian crisis would be compounded by the energy resource shortage.
There could be additional problems with fuel for heating. This would create a severe social and economic disaster in the region. One of the first consequences would be a rapid outflow of people from Transnistria, particularly among the youth and working-age citizens, which would further exacerbate the administrative and budgetary crisis.
Moreover, it would be impossible to stop this flow by closing the region's "borders." All of this would likely lead to a quick collapse of the regime, forcing it to negotiate with Chi?in?u for reunification. If the Moldovan authorities demonstrate flexibility, this reunification could happen very rapidly.
Of course, the presence of Russian troops complicates this process, but it does not make it impossible. Serious challenges will arise regarding the reintegration of society and also in the humanitarian domain. On the contrary, there are ample grounds to expect that Moldova will not face a shortage of financial and expert resources to overcome the crisis, especially if this scenario unfolds soon.
The scale of funding will be moderate for Western donors, given the small size and population of the region. Moreover, Western players will view Transnistria as a "testing ground." Looking ahead, there will be significantly larger and more complex problems to tackle in Ukraine following the expected de-occupation of its territories, including Crimea, which has been occupied for over ten years.
Thus, the reintegration of Transnistria will allow the West to refine its approaches and theories before addressing the much larger issues in Ukraine. Furthermore, it could create a model of "exemplary reintegration," enhancing the attractiveness of this scenario for residents of other occupied territories, such as those in Ukraine and Georgia. Sergiy Sydorenko
European Pravda, Editor Chi?in?u - Kyiv The research was prepared for Black Sea Security Forum
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