The EU, communism, and a “new perspective” on Ukraine: all about Stoianoglo, Moldova’s potential new president
Romanian by passport. Gagauz by ethnicity. Moldovan by career and a second passport.
A prosecutor by profession. He is the presidential candidate for Moldova's pro-Russian Socialist Party. This is Alexandr Stoianoglo, a presidential contender who could potentially defeat Maia Sandu in Moldova's second election round.
While he declares support for Moldova's path to the EU, he's running as a candidate from a party with an openly pro-Russian stance. He talks of "support for Ukraine in the war" but avoids any mention of Russian aggression. He also promises to propose a new peace plan, entirely different from Ukraine's.
If Stoianoglo becomes Moldova's president, it will be highly significant for Ukraine. This outcome would indicate a major shift in the neighbouring state with shared EU aspirations. Advertisement:
Though his victory is not certain, this scenario remains highly plausible. European Pravda delves into who Stoianoglo is, the concerns surrounding him, and his views on Ukraine.
The "outsider" candidate of a pro-Russian party
"I believe it's wrong. The president, top officials, and security representatives should have only Moldovan citizenship." This is how Alexandr Stoianoglo, in an interview with RTVI, criticised his main opponent, Maia Sandu, for holding dual citizenship.
President Sandu has both Moldovan and Romanian passports, as Romania offers simplified citizenship restoration for those whose ancestors lived in the Kingdom of Romania (which included right-bank Moldova) before WWII. Many Moldovans have taken advantage of this to obtain EU passports. While dual citizenship is widely accepted in Moldova, Russian-speaking communities, with fewer local roots, are more sceptical.
These voters form a base for the openly pro-Russian Socialist Party (PSRM), which often criticises Sandu's Romanian passport - a stance echoed by Stoianoglo. However, there's a twist: just before the interview aired, Moldova's Ziarul de Garda revealed that Stoianoglo himself holds a Romanian passport, a fact confirmed by the Romanian authorities. This story goes beyond the insincerity of the Socialist campaign.
After all, lies and manipulation aren't rare in elections. What's more telling is what it reveals: Moldova's main opposition party has put forward a candidate who is disconnected from the party's core values. And it's true.
Stoianoglo's candidacy appeared unexpectedly
after Socialist leader Igor Dodon stepped back, having lost Moscow's trust and recognising that another defeat would jeopardise his position as party leader. This meant that Alexandr Stoianoglo became the chosen candidate, fitting perfectly into Moscow's vision for the campaign.
A prosecutor without charisma
Stoianoglo lacks experience in public campaigning. In past elections in Gagauzia, his home region, he was unsuccessful, though he entered parliament in 2009 and 2010 through party lists without active campaigning.
At a final rally in Comrat, Stoianoglo's dull speech still resonated with thousands, who applauded eagerly.
He avoided populist promises, sticking to vague assertions about a better future, which was exactly what voters seemed to want. As a result, he gained two-thirds of the votes in Comrat and 29% nationwide (excluding the diaspora).
Alexandr Stoianoglo is a career prosecutor who climbed the ranks from trainee in Chisinau during the Transnistrian conflict to landing the top prosecutor job in Gagauzia by 1995. He served in the prosecutor's office until 2007, eventually becoming Moldova's deputy attorney general, then entered politics, aligning with forces previously opposed to Dodon and his allies.
Pro-Europe, with conditions
2009 was a pivotal year for Moldova. After elections that saw the Communist Party once again in power, protests erupted, escalating into a revolution marked by the storming and vandalising of the parliament and presidency buildings.
The details and causes of these events remain unclear to this day. The political crisis ultimately led to the fall of the communist government. In the snap elections held that year, a coalition of pro-European forces narrowly won, including the Democratic Party, through which the relatively unknown Alexandr Stoianoglo entered parliament and became a deputy speaker.
This period has become a key part of Stoianoglo's campaign.
Running as the candidate of a pro-Russian party, he emphasises his support for Moldova in Europe at every opportunity. In his brief acceptance speech as a presidential candidate, he stated, "Many people know I support European integration," but he didn't elaborate on what he aims to achieve on the European path if elected. His pro-European stance has become an electoral asset, though many observers in Moldova question its sincerity, with no direct evidence either way.
The only significant parliamentary vote in which he refused to align with other pro-European colleagues was Moldova's 2012 decision to condemn communism.
"I disagree with condemning communism. I don't see the point. People in my community don't support it," Stoianoglo explained.
This is a troubling point. Many Gagauzians, exposed to Russian media, view the Soviet Union in a positive way. A statue of Lenin still stands in the centre of Comrat and other Gagauz towns, even though the Gagauz people faced severe repression under the USSR, including orchestrated famine and mass deportations by Stalin.
In 2019, it was actually Dodon's party that helped appoint the "pro-European" Stoianoglo as Moldova's prosecutor general.
Corruption, oligarchs, and other accusations
While the uncertainty surrounding Moldova's choice between a European or Russian orientation may benefit Stoianoglo, another aspect of his political biography works against him: the corruption allegations. In 2019, he became the prosecutor general of Moldova. However, key events unfolded the following year, before Sandu's election as president, during a time when both the coalition and presidency were under Dodon's control.
Stoianoglo personally signed a court submission to suspend the sentence of the controversial Moldovan oligarch Veaceslav Platon, who is believed to be involved in the so-called Laundromat - a scheme to launder EUR22 billion of dirty Russian money through Moldova's banking system, along with various other crimes. He argued that one verdict was baseless and that another charge against Platon had not yet reached a verdict, claiming that Platon should be released. Platon was released "temporarily" without having his passport revoked.
The next day he "unexpectedly" fled Moldova to the UK. Stoianoglo later expressed regret, labelling Platon as someone who had abused his temporary freedom. It subsequently emerged that even while in prison, Platon had enjoyed a relatively free regime.
This incident highlights the level of oligarchic influence in Moldova even from prison. It raises suspicions that Stoianoglo may have taken a bribe to facilitate Platon's escape. Under Sandu's administration, a criminal case was opened against Stoianoglo related to this episode, but the charges have yet to go to court.
The manner of Stoianoglo's dismissal deserves special attention. Sandu's government acted arbitrarily, contrary to rules and constitutional procedures,
driven by a deep-seated belief that the prosecutor general was corrupt. Overall, Moldova's current authorities often overlook democratic procedures in their fight against oligarchy and Russian influence.
After his dismissal, Stoianoglo filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which ruled in his favour, stating that he was denied the right to appeal, but this did not allow him to return to his post.
Will Stoianoglo win the elections?
At first glance, Sandu achieved the highest result in the first round with a significant lead - 42.5% to Stoianoglo's 26.6%. However, Sandu's victory is far from guaranteed. Her electoral reserve is minimal, while Stoianoglo has the potential to attract voters from other candidates.
The pro-Russian Socialist Party's strategists have opted for a winning strategy, meaning that the turnout of supporters from both camps will play a decisive role, which is unpredictable, though there are grounds for sceptical forecasts. Part of the electorate may be put off by Stoianoglo's indirect support for Ilan Shor, a former Moldovan oligarch involved in the theft of a billion euros, who is currently hiding in Moscow and acting as a "hand of the Kremlin" in Moldovan politics. For many voters, anything related to Shor is considered toxic, and so now Sandu is trying to establish a strong, albeit artificial, connection between them.
Additionally, it matters that Stoianoglo is Gagauz. Opinions like "Can a Gagauz really govern Moldova?" are not uncommon on social media. Finally, another issue for Stoianoglo is that the state language, Romanian, is not his mother tongue, and his proficiency is far from ideal.
In social media conversations, Moldovans frequently express their disbelief that he couldn't at least improve his command of the state language for the debates. For some Moldovans in the political centre, proficiency in Romanian may be a determining factor, and not all voters will be willing to overlook this when it comes to Stoianoglo. Moreover, for some right-leaning voters, this could serve as an additional motivation to go to the polls and support Sandu to prevent an undesirable candidate from winning.
Other pro-Russian politicians and populists have a much better command of Romanian than Stoianoglo, as for them it is one of their native languages. So he faces an additional disadvantage.
Between the Kremlin, "peace" and common sense
The policy Stoianoglo would pursue if elected remains unclear. Despite the criticism directed at him, it must be acknowledged that he is not an agent of the Kremlin, neither openly nor covertly.
However, he is also certainly not a genuinely pro-European politician. If Stoianoglo wins, he will attempt to manoeuvre, play the "multivector" game, and try to be "one of his own" both for the EU and for Moscow, without offending Ukraine or Romania. But he will likely find this impossible to achieve.
What he is currently saying is flatly unacceptable for Ukraine.
Stoianoglo is careful to avoid specifics regarding the Russian war in his statements. He has never used the phrase "Russian aggression against Ukraine", at least during the campaign, and prior to his candidacy, despite his alleged "Europeanness", he did not find the courage to condemn Russia's criminal invasion. At the same time, he insists that he has a stance.
In particular, during a debate on Sunday, he repeated several times, "We support Ukraine in the war that is ongoing," without ever mentioning who is on the other side of that war. Stoianoglo has also announced that if he wins, Moldova will start promoting some of its own "peace initiatives". The candidate did not elaborate on his ideas but indicated that they do not align with Zelenskyy's peace plan.
Political rhetoric may surely change after the elections. If Stoianoglo wins, he will face a choice. On one hand, he will be pressured by reality and the European funding that keeps Moldova afloat.
On the other hand, he will be limited by the support of the pro-Russian Socialist Party. Pro-European political forces will not quickly extend a hand to such a controversial president. It is clear that under the current political stance Stoianoglo is proclaiming, he will have no chance of fostering good neighbourly relations with Ukraine as president of Moldova.
Moreover, the time when states like Moldova had a real chance to "navigate" between East and West has passed. Chisinau will have to make a choice and understand that if Moldova falls under pro-Russian control, its neighbours, primarily Ukraine, will definitely take countermeasures. The only question is what those measures will be and whether Kyiv will limit itself to economic pressure on its neighbour if it becomes pro-Russian.
Sergiy Sydorenko
European Pravda, Editor
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