Let's wait until after Easter. When will the elections be held in Ukraine?

"There will be elections. They've agreed to it. There will be elections in Ukraine".

A long-dormant political process in Ukraine was reignited by a confident and unequivocal statement by Steve Witkoff, US President Donald Trump's Special Envoy to the Middle East and his close friend, during an interview on 22 March. Ukrainian government officials became alarmed as they could no longer deny that the topic of elections was being discussed in talks with the United States. Opposition members and potential newcomers to the political scene quickly realised that a government reboot could occur much sooner than expected, posing a risk of being left behind.

An article by The Economist has added fuel to the fire, claiming that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's team is actively preparing a scenario for possible elections as early as the summer of 2025.

Ukrainska Pravda has therefore decided to investigate whether the Ukrainian authorities are genuinely preparing for early elections, whether presidential or parliamentary, and how Zelenskyy's re-election prospects will be influenced by his spat with Trump.

The triumphant fiasco in the Oval Office

The Economist article mentioned above claimed that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy convened a meeting at the President's Office in the second half of March and instructed his team to prepare for an election. Ukrainska Pravda sources in Zelenskyy's entourage have dodged the question of such a meeting but do not deny the preparations themselves.

"Perhaps there was some kind of meeting. But at the moment, nothing is being done systematically.

There is simply no person who would assemble any headquarters or large working groups, who would say that we are doing this and that, you run here, say this, take care of these. And the president is clearly not up to it yet. That's why something is happening, but it can't be called real preparation," says a Zelenskyy team member familiar with the matter.

Bankova Street (where the Ukrainian President's Office is located) is currently less focused on organising the elections and more on searching for a grand narrative for them. To script the drama of the upcoming electoral process, the president's team must first answer three fundamental questions:

Is Zelenskyy the lead actor?
What type of elections should be staged and in what sequence?
What strategies will be used to secure victory in this performance?

An analysis of the ruling team's actions, discussed in more detail below, suggests that Bankova Street has chosen to provide Zelenskyy with a favourable opportunity to run and win. It's now up to him to decide whether to seize this chance.

At the very least, the system of government needs to receive a signal that the leader is present and in the game. Without this assurance, ensuring the system works effectively and remains loyal will be extremely difficult. Regarding election sequencing, Ukrainska Pravda has found that a rapid presidential campaign would be the most effective scenario for retaining power.

This option limits the time available for the incumbent's rivals who will be allowed to run and organise their campaigns. Zelenskyy's electoral victory would also provide an excellent springboard for the parliamentary campaign. If Zelenskyy remains a strong president, it will be easier to position small and new parties, teetering on the brink of entering parliament, within a clearly defined frame of reference.

Until recently, the most difficult questions were: How does anyone win the election in the first place? How can a candidate boost their rating?

Neither the confrontation with Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin, which had previously united Ukrainians behind Zelenskyy, nor a public attack on Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine's fifth President, through the imposition of sanctions has resulted in a tangible increase in Zelenskyy's rating. One influential Ukrainian political strategist told Ukrainska Pravda that when the war became routine once again, some voters began to view Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine's Armed Forces, as an "ideal leader".

Others sought out new heroes, while Zelenskyy was left with no resources for growth in popularity on the domestic front. Back in early February, political technologists at the President's Office had struggled to devise an effective communication strategy that could help Zelenskyy reverse the months-long trend of steady decline in his rating. That was right up until the Trump-Zelenskyy spat in the Oval Office on 28 February.

Despite the catastrophic impact on bilateral relations between the two nations, it had an unexpected effect on Zelenskyy as a politician. "What is known as 'rallying around the flag' happened: Ukrainians saw an unprecedented threat in Trump - he wasn't attacking Zelenskyy, but each of them. All differences therefore had to be set aside and unity was needed.

The president immediately saw a boost in his rating and gained loyal media support because how can you criticise someone being attacked by an external aggressor?" said a political strategist who once worked for the President's Office, speaking to Ukrainska Pravda. No polling company has publicly released presidential ratings since the spat, but they have provided data on trust levels which can be used to assess overall shifts in electoral dynamics. The latest data from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) reveals that in March, Zelenskyy's support level surged by +12% compared to early February, reaching 69%.

Meanwhile, KIIS reported a dramatic shift in perceptions of Trump.

In December 2024, 51% of Ukrainians viewed his presidency positively, whereas in March 2025, 73% deemed it harmful to Ukraine. For the most part, this shift is a natural response to the aggressive rhetoric from the White House. But it has also been stoked by various "mouthpieces" from the President's Office - political strategists who resort to dirty tricks.

They've been dishing out insults verging on the vulgar, consigning Trump to the gutter and calling him a "bully" and a "ginger fag*ot". The only issue with the "rallying around the flag" effect is that no one can predict how long it will last. Therefore, from the perspective of political strategists in Bankova Street, the most logical step would be to hold elections as soon as possible.

Concealed but obvious preparations

Preparing for elections is not a process that can be managed by just five or six people and kept hidden from the public.

This is especially true because electoral law will need to be amended to hold post-war elections. Oleh Didenko, Head of Ukraine's Central Election Commission, elaborated on this in an interview with Ukrainska Pravda. Changes to the law are necessary for technical reasons, such as the destruction of infrastructure, voter migration, etc.

However, the timing and sequence of the elections also make these law amendments inevitable. If the current law remains in force, then immediately after martial law is lifted, the Central Election Commission will announce parliamentary elections with a 60-day campaign period, while the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) will schedule the presidential elections with a 90-day campaign. However, as we wrote earlier, it is crucial for the authorities to hold the presidential elections first.

Amendments to the electoral legislation are currently being drafted by the Central Election Commission in cooperation with experts.

These amendments will need to go through the relevant committee in the Rada and then be put to a vote by MPs in two readings. This process requires the involvement of hundreds of people. For now, Ukrainska Pravda sources in all these institutions unanimously report that there is no significant progress in this direction.

Even within the president's faction, there is no clear understanding of what is being prepared and in what manner. "Something seems to be happening on Bankova Street, as if preparations for some elections are underway. But no one has explained anything to the MPs," says a source from the Servant of the People party.

"What is there to say about elections when the Rada is not officially informed about anything, even peace talks? Poroshenko and others recently disrupted a parliamentary session because they demanded at least some information from officials. They got nothing - [Ruslan] Stefanchuk [Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada] simply closed the session," another MP told Ukrainska Pravda.

The presidential faction and party are steering clear of any political movements to avoid trouble. Their caution has reached an almost comical level. Since autumn 2024, Olena Shuliak, the official leader of the Servant of the People party, has been considering stepping down, and the party leadership has wanted to replace her.

However... "Everything was ready to make Misha [a diminutive form of Mykhailo] Fedorov the party leader. But no one is making a move.

Because as soon as we start doing anything, everyone will rush in and shout, 'Aha, the government is preparing for elections!' We don't need that. So everything is on hold," an MP from the Servant of the People party told Ukrainska Pravda in January 2025.

"Even making technical appointments in regional branches or replacing inactive members of the political council is impossible. [Davyd] Arakhamiia [the leader of the Servant of the People party faction within the Ukrainian Rada] tells everyone, 'Friends, don't move anything, or everything will collapse'. And that's how we work," adds Ukrainska Pravda's source from the Servant of the People party.

However, some behind-the-scenes preparations for elections by the government team are still underway. All discussions on this matter point to the name of Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. Most Ukrainska Pravda sources claim that he is currently trying to carry out preparatory work, developing a strategy and so on.

"Misha brought in political consultants from Spain, who are actually Ukrainians. He is brainstorming, looking for options, trying to come up with something for the party. But this is not about campaign headquarters or regional networks yet - just a search for ideas," says one of the political strategists close to the President's Office.

When asked by Ukrainska Pravda about election preparations, Fedorov stated that he is focused on the war and is not even sure whether any elections are possible. The political process on Bankova Street also involves well-known IT entrepreneur Oleksandr Olshanskyi, often called "the father of the Ukrainian internet", who once helped protect Ukrainska Pravda's servers from attacks by Viktor Yanukovych's team [Yanukovych is the pro-Russian former president of Ukraine who fled the country after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 - ed.]. Olshanskyi's role includes working with sociologists, which means he can provide strategic insights and interpret electoral trends.

Another group involved in searching for new political forces for the government is the team under Andrii Yermak, Head of the Ukrainian President's Office. This includes Oleksii Kuleba, Deputy Prime Minister for Ukraine's Reconstruction, and Viktor Mykyta, Deputy Head of the President's Office for Regional Policy. Initially, after Kuleba moved from Bankova Street to the Cabinet of Ministers in September 2024 and Mykyta was appointed to the President's Office, they competed for influence.

Mykyta eventually found his place within Kuleba's hierarchy. Recently, Tymur Tkachenko, Head of Kyiv City Military Administration, has been working closely with them. In the context of our topic, the Plich-o-plich (Side by Side) project overseen by Kuleba is of special interest.

This is a platform for mutual aid between hromadas and cities, where successful hromadas help those affected by the war to rebuild. [A hromada is an administrative unit designating a village, several villages, or a town, and their adjacent territories - ed.] This initiative has the potential to become either a new recruitment base for a renewed Zelenskyy party or at least a satellite political project supporting it. However, city mayors and leaders of hromadas are a rather specific audience and not easily integrated into pro-government projects.

Kyiv has previously attempted to create a "party of mayors", but none of these efforts have ever led to anything significant. Another major project that could serve as a showcase for elections is the newly created Ministry of National Unity, headed by Oleksii Chernyshov. It was intended as a tool to engage Ukrainians abroad, but progress has been slow.

Firstly, feedback from Ukrainian emigrants has been far from positive for the authorities. The myth of overwhelming support abroad has remained just that - a myth. Secondly, the idea of opening UnityHubs - large spaces with co-working areas, consular services, employment assistance and meeting places - has faced resistance.

While Germany has been actively involved in their launch, Poland, preoccupied with its presidential campaign, has quietly sabotaged the process. Local politicians are not keen on the idea of Ukrainian presence in their country taking on the characteristics of an organised political force. Discussions continue, but quick results are unlikely.

And, last but not least, among those crucial to the electoral process is Oleh Tatarov. Most of Ukrainska Pravda's sources within both the government and the opposition say that research is being conducted under Tatarov's "general scientific supervision" on how far one can go in creating problems for, say, Petro Poroshenko without the risk of external interference. Is it OK to prosecute the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine for the Medvedchuk-related cases? [Viktor Medvedchuk is a Ukrainian businessman and pro-Russian politician to whose daughter Putin is godfather - ed.].

What about the Kharkiv Pact and Russian operational videos showing "money transfers" from Moscow? [The Kharkiv Pact (2010) was an agreement between Ukraine and Russia that extended Russia's lease on Sevastopol's naval base in exchange for a gas discount. It was annulled in 2014 after Russia annexed Crimea - ed.]. Or is the motivation too obvious?

However, it would be a mistake to think that Tatarov is focused solely on Poroshenko. There are also the mayors of large cities and military commanders. Soon there will be members of the government team who have been so blatantly involved in corruption at Odesa's ports and companies in Zaporizhzhia that it will be impossible to divert attention from them.

* * * Unexpectedly for many in Ukraine, including the government team, the fiasco at the White House has given Zelenskyy a new boost in legitimacy in the eyes of Ukrainians. Some immediately began to speculate that the spat in Washington was a masterstroke orchestrated by the Office of the President of Ukraine.

But to be honest, it is hard to imagine that the same people who came up with the national cashback programme could also devise such a brilliant political move. [National cashback is a government programme in Ukraine that refunds part of citizens' expenditure on goods and services produced in Ukraine - ed.] That said, the President's Office still deserves credit - it remains capable of swiftly responding to electoral shifts and adjusting its strategy accordingly. Having received a surge in support following "Trump's aggression", the President's Office team is entirely capable of turning it into a quick, small electoral victory.

That is, of course, if elections actually take place in the foreseeable future. "Are we preparing for elections? Yes.

But are we preparing for elections in the next three to six months? No. We are simply making sure everyone knows we are still in the game," an Ukrainska Pravda source from Bankova Street summarised.

Roman Romaniuk, Ukrainska Pravda

Translation: Artem Yakymyshyn, Anna Kybukevych

Edited by: Susan McDonald