European Defence Commissioner: “An attack on an EU and NATO member is a very real threat”
For the first time in EU history, we have a European Defence Commissioner. The position is held by Andrius Kubilius, a Lithuanian politician and former prime minister who is a long-time friend of Ukraine. The creation of the position raised many questions among EU member states.
What should the commissioner's role be in an area where national governments hold exclusive authority? Could this lead to tensions between the European Union and NATO? But Donald Trump's return to politics has shown how timely this appointment was.
With the change of US president, EU nations now face a reality in which the White House no longer makes any secret of its intention to "step back from Europe" and is demanding more self-reliance from its European partners in defence matters. Europe is now being forced to "find its place" in this new reality -
and also to determine Ukraine's place within it. Kubilius believes EU membership for Ukraine is a key element in building a self-sufficient European security system, whatever shape it may ultimately take.
Because defence is no longer a theoretical issue. Protection against Russia has become a practical necessity: Kubilius is among those who believe a future attack on the EU by Putin is a very real threat. As a result, European states are preparing to provide more weapons to Ukraine's Armed Forces, strengthening both Ukraine's defence industry and their own, and are braced for dramatic developments.
The commissioner spoke to European Pravda about all this in an interview during his visit to Kyiv.
"Russia has switched to a war economy, and it can't switch back"
When will Russia attack the EU? When it comes to predictions, I pay attention to what the intelligence services say, not politicians. The intelligence services of Germany, Denmark and others are saying that Russia could be ready to attack us (or, as some call it, "to test Article 5") before 2030.
Some are saying that it could happen even earlier, during the next three years. And the reason is that Russia will have the capacity to launch an attack because they have switched to a war economy and they are producing a lot, and more importantly, they won't be able to switch back. If a peace or a ceasefire is established in Ukraine, they will continue to produce and stockpile an amount of weapons which would eventually allow them to start a new aggression.
That means that a long-lasting ceasefire will bring a full-fledged attack on the EU closer. Practically, yes. Of course, peace for Ukraine is very important, and we support it as much as we can.
But we need to be very realistic that peace in Ukraine will not mean that Russia will stop planning its next aggressions.
Maybe against Ukraine again, or maybe against EU or NATO member states. We consider this a very realistic scenario. And that is why the only way to deter a Russian attack is to increase our preparedness for it.
I believe not everyone in the EU realises this. Some are still in denial. Well, you definitely cannot expect everybody to be on the same page.
But when we presented the ReArm Europe proposals to the Council of the EU, the whole Council supported them, even countries known for vetoing support for Ukraine - they also voted for increasing defence spending and so on. You mean Hungary voted for it? Yes, they supported it.
In society, the signals are more mixed. But opinion polls say that Europeans are generally supportive of strengthening their defence. It comes down to how worried people are about Putin attacking the EU.
Of course, that awareness varies by region. Countries in the east of the EU, particularly the Baltic states, can see this better. But that's quite natural.
Can we blame people who live far away from Russia for being less worried about the possibility of a Russian attack than we are? And this works both ways. For example, when southern EU countries were hit by a huge refugee crisis back in 2015-16, we in the Baltics said: it's not our problem.
We needed to have immigration on our borders instrumentalised by [self-styled Belarusian president Alexander] Lukashenko in order for us to understand that we need solidarity with regard to migration, too. It's the same with defence.
"We need to be ready not only for the wars of today, but also the wars of tomorrow"
What can you do to change EU defence? First, we need to take care of what we call hard-core defence or conventional defence: weapons, weapons systems and so on.
That is what we are doing now. NATO is reviewing the capability targets for all NATO member states, including those on the European continent. That is a NATO job.
The EU doesn't have military expertise, but the EU has money.

European Pravda spoke with the Commissioner on the sidelines of the Kyiv Security Forum (C)European Union, 2025 So the first thing we can do is to collect capability targets from member states in order to see the aggregated demand.
Based on that, we will be ready to prepare what we call an industry output plan. And industry is the EU's responsibility. Second: we need to have the financial means to fund all of that.
This comes with the ReArm Europe plan, which envisages an additional EUR800 billion to be spent on defence by EU member states. Third: in June, we will pass some very important legislation: the Defence Simplification Omnibus. This is about removing the bureaucratic obstacles which undoubtedly exist so that defence industries are able to expand their production.
Fourth: we are also working with innovative industries on how to modernise our defence industry. We need to be ready not only for the wars of today, but also the wars of tomorrow. And this is why we are very keen to engage and cooperate with Ukrainians.
This is very much needed for us, not only for Ukraine. That is why on Monday, we will hold a forum of European and Ukrainian defence industries in Brussels. Fifth, also very important: in the autumn, we are bringing out a communication on military mobility.
This is about our readiness to quickly move military means in case of need. Military mobility is more on the NATO side, I would say. They've been discussing it. But it's also about finances, and this needs huge finances.
This is where the EU comes in: together with NATO, we identify which kinds of infrastructure - roads, railways, air cargo systems and so on - are the most important to invest in. And last but not least: we are preparing, together with the member states, a much more concrete list of flagship projects where we need to concentrate our efforts. For example, air defence systems for the whole of Europe, with a special focus on systems which are called strategic enablers, including AWACS or satellite intelligence data systems, because here we are heavily dependent on American services.
So the EU is going to decrease its dependence on the US. That is what we are planning, but not in an angry way - as part of a natural division of responsibility. Because we need to realise that in 10 years' time, the Americans will be forced to shift their attention to the IndoPacific.
"Europe needs to be ready to defend itself"
There is one thing you didn't mention among the priorities, so let me ask you about it directly.
There is a clause in the EU treaty that obliges member states to respond jointly if one of them is attacked. This clause is said to be even stronger than NATO's Article 5. Do you think this opens the door to a joint EU defence policy?
NOTE: Article 42(7) of the Lisbon treaty says: "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter...
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation." A very good question, and my answer would be from two sides. First, that question was raised when we were writing the White Paper on European Defence.
But I made a deliberate choice to concentrate instead on the material side of defence - weapons, weapon systems, finances and so on. This is our priority now. But definitely we shall also need to come to the European security architecture, including but not limited to Article 42.
And here, if you read my mission letter - the programme which the Commission president tasked me to carry out - it says that the White Paper was the first task, but in the longer term, the mission letter says: Europe needs to be able to defend itself. But this is in the long term. Even beyond your mandate?
Yes, even beyond, because we can't do that so fast. We need to have some kind of agreement with our transatlantic partners about how we build our capacities until they are present on the European continent, but we are taking more and more responsibilities in a rational way. And then the next sentence of the mission letter says: if Europe needs to take care of its own defence, then there is a need for a European security architecture, and for that weapons are not enough: you need to have some kind of clear institutional arrangement.
It's not against NATO, but nevertheless, we need to have that capacity. And my mission letter requires the creation of a true European defence union, which means that really we are moving into a much more integrated way of doing defence in Europe. And this will demand a lot of thinking and discussions about how to do it.
For Ukraine, this is particularly important, as the US and some other allies are not ready to grant us NATO membership. Could a European defence union serve as a substitute? I cannot elaborate too much - that will be up to the member states.
But I'd like to stress that we have two things at the same time. First: Ukraine is going to become a member of the European Union. Second: Europe needs to be ready to defend itself.
So Ukraine is becoming part of this European security architecture, and Ukraine - with its experience, with its military force, the strongest on this European continent, with its developed defence industry - will play a crucial role within that architecture. As you said, Russia could very possibly attack the EU in just a few years. Do you believe the European Union will be able to increase its production capacity significantly in such a short time?
This is a big task. It's not easy.
But I tell everybody to look at the example of Ukraine. In 2022, Ukraine was able to produce weapons with a value of EUR1 billion.
This year, according to all the plans, its industry is able to produce EUR35 billion worth. But Ukraine only managed to significantly increase its production capacity after the full-scale war began, despite being in an undeclared war with Russia since 2014. Does this suggest that the EU would only be able to do the same if and when it is actually attacked?
My point is very simple: it's better to do this before a war starts. Because that is the only way to deter the war, if you show that you are able to produce the quantity of weapons needed. That is the only way to convince Putin that he would be making a big mistake if he tried to test the EU and NATO member states when the EU has an economy which is 10 times stronger than Russia's.
"Ukraine's defence industry is treated on an equal footing with Europe's"
Could you elaborate further on the EUR800 billion of extra defence spending?
There are two main elements. One is EUR650 billion, and that is the predicted increase in national defence spending by member states. EU member states are currently spending around 2%.
Some of them less, some much more, but the average is 2% of GDP for their military, weapons procurement and so on. There are plans for the Alliance to agree on new requirements at the NATO summit whereby the Allies should spend not 2%, but 3.5%, or even more. That's why the Commission took the decision to allow member states to spend an additional 1.5% of GDP on defence, and that 1.5% will not be included in the calculation of the deficit.
Because the deficit is a big obstacle for member states to increase their defence spending. That EUR650 billion for defence will not be regulated by the Commission at all. And there is another instrument worth EUR150 billion - these are loans, also for defence procurement.
At the same time, we can expand production for the defence industry. With these long-term plans for military spending, banks are becoming more interested in financing extra defence production, and also the EIB is changing its regulation to open more of their resources to be invested in defence and dual-use production.
So things are moving. And we are also expecting that an additional programme, the EDIP programme, will be approved by the summer.
That programme would allow the European Commission to use European money to support the expansion of industries. The sums involved are being discussed, and the European Parliament is looking for a way to get these funds. In the EUR800 billion for procurement of weaponry, will there be a share for Ukraine's Armed Forces?
Yes. EUR150 billion is loans which only member states can take out, but they can use those loans for joint procurement with Ukraine - even procuring from Ukrainian industry for Ukrainian needs. This is the first time that Ukrainian industry has been treated on an equal footing with European defence industries.
And we are looking for additional ways of incentivising member states to do that, because the loans are really very attractive. And part of the EUR650 billion for national defence spending can also be spent on more weapons for Ukraine. That's up to the member states.
Although my feeling is that member states are looking more at how to increase their own defence capabilities. To conclude, I have a difficult question regarding joint military production. I'm sure you've heard about the recent scandal involving 120mm rounds that reportedly did not meet quality standards.
Has this incident created obstacles for our European partners in terms of relying on Ukrainian defence industry facilities? I can tell you that on the European side, I don't hear so much about those kinds of problems. Quite the contrary: for now, I see Europeans coming with their industries to Ukraine more and more.
European prime ministers are bringing their industries with them on their visits to Ukraine to look for joint product development, joint ventures and things like that. And as I said, on Monday we shall have a big event in Brussels - the EU-Ukraine Defence Industry Forum. So I don't see any signs of mistrust.
Instead, I see more and more understanding on the part of European industries that they need to learn a lot from the Ukrainians. Sergiy Sydorenko, Editor, European Pravda
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