Why did Vučić need unrest in northern Kosovo, and is Russia involved?
The armed clash at the end of September in northern Kosovo, populated by ethnic Serbs, could have far-reaching consequences. It turns out that Milan Radoicic, a Kosovo MP from Serbian List, leaded the attackers, which casts a shadow on Serbia's involvement in the clash. Furthermore, there are questions about a possible Russian connection to this story.
Find out more about the provocation and its consequences in an interesting article by Yurii Panchenko, European Pravda editor: Punishment for Serbia: how will the story with 'little green men' and casualties in Kosovo end. The clash in northern Kosovo lasted less than a day. It all began on the night of September 24 when police patrolling the Serb-populated northern region noticed the construction of barricades near the border with Serbia.
Attackers were firing at the police (resulting in the death of one policemen), after which they fled to the village of Banjska, barricading themselves in a Serbian Orthodox monastery. It is still unknown why the Kosovo police allowed the attackers to leave the monastery and cross the Serbian border. However, the law enforcement officers managed to wound several attackers and kill four of them.
It is truly impossible to hide the connection between the attackers and the Serbian authorities. The deputy chairman of Serbian List, a branch of Serbian President Vucic's party in Kosovo, Milan Radoicic, admitted his involvement in the clash. In this situation, the Kosovo authorities received arguments to demand punishment for Belgrade from the West, including sanctions.
Calls for punishing Belgrade are heard not only from Kosovo. The White House has announced an increase in the KFOR peacekeeping contingent - a very clear signal for Belgrade. Such a strong condemnation of the Serbian authorities has not been seen in a long time.
So, as claimed in Pristina, were the actions of Radoicic and his like-minded individuals aimed at annexing the territory of northern Kosovo, similar to Russia's actions in Donbas in 2014. The reaction of Belgrade, especially in the first hours, supports this version. Serbian President Vucic stated that he had long "warned that this could happen, and it did - the Serbs rebelled." He also declared a day of mourning for the killed Serbs.
There was even evidence of coordination with the Russian embassy. In the end, the success of the "special operation" in northern Kosovo would have further strengthened Vucic's position, which would have been very timely considering his plans to hold early parliamentary elections on December 17. However, this scenario failed.
No matter how fanciful it may sound. The question of whether Belgrade attempted to play out a scenario similar to Russia's actions in 2014 in Donbas remains open for now. Currently, this assumption seems too fantastic.
The question of whether Russia was involved in this conflict remains open. Many in the Serbian opposition talk about this, pointing to the figure of a lawyer who represented Milan Radoicic's interests. This lawyer's name is Goran Petronijevic, and he likely has connections to Russian special services.
In particular, in last October, he was an "observer" in the "elections" held by the Russian authorities in the occupied Ukrainian territories. However, no matter what this scenario was, it failed. This should fundamentally change the dynamics in the triangle of "Serbia - Kosovo - the West."
The strategy of "appeasing Belgrade" is evidently coming to an end.
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