Zaluzhny: Ukraine faces a “positional” warfare
2 November, 2023 Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces General Valerii Zaluzhny. Photo from open sources Valerii Zaluzhny, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has published an essay in which he outlines his outlook on the developments at the front and formulates solutions that will turn the tide of hostilities.
The article was published by The Economist. According to Zaluzhny, due to many subjective and objective reasons, the war is gradually shifting to positional warfare, which can be difficult for both the armed forces and the state as a whole to overcome. At the same time, the Russian Federation benefits from prolonging the war, as this gives it the opportunity to restore and increase its military power.
To avoid transitioning to positional warfare, such as the "trench warfare" of 1914-1918, it is necessary to develop capabilities and find new approaches to overcome military parity with the enemy. According to the Commander-in-Chief, the primary things needed to overcome this situation at this stage of the war are the following:
- gaining air supremacy;
- overcoming a deeply entrenched system of minefields;
- improving the effectiveness of counter-battery warfare;
- improving the effectiveness of electronic warfare;
- creating and training the necessary reserves.
One of the most important components is the development of the air force, which will enable gaining control of the skies, which is necessary for large-scale ground operations. It is noted that at the beginning of the war, the Armed Forces had 120 combat aircraft.
Of these, only one-third were fit for use. "The Russian air force has suffered huge losses, we have destroyed more than 550 air defense systems, but they maintain a significant advantage over us and continue creating new strike squadrons. This advantage has made it difficult for us to move forward.
Russian air defense systems are increasingly preventing our aircraft from flying. Our defense is doing the same to Russia," Zaluzhny noted. In such circumstances, a significant part of manned aviation's reconnaissance and air strike missions has been taken over by drones.
Therefore, they should be part of Ukraine's response. In particular, it is proposed to use massive attacks by unmanned aerial target simulators and attack UAVs to overload the enemy's air defense system and expose its elements with subsequent destruction. The development of hunter drones to intercept enemy UAVs should be another area of development.
The rapid development of unmanned aircraft and the saturation of the frontline with them points to the second priority: the development of electronic warfare equipment that will jam communication and navigation signals. Electronic warfare is the key to victory in the drone war. "Over the past decade, Russia has modernized its electronic warfare forces, creating a new kind of military and 60 new types of equipment.
In this, it surpasses us: 65% of our jamming platforms at the beginning of the war were produced in the Soviet times. We have already developed many of our own electronic protection systems that can prevent jamming. But we also need greater access to electronic intelligence from our allies.
We need to improve electronic warfare from our drones over a wider range of radio frequencies while avoiding accidental jamming of our own drones," Zaluzhny says. It is proposed to introduce elements of the Pokrova, Graphite, and Quartz situational awareness systems, along with systems for exchanging information received from intelligence assets, into the management processes. The defense forces should increase their capabilities to monitor the current electronic situation in the areas of combat operations by using the capabilities of partner countries.
It is necessary to provide expanded access to information from air, sea, and space electronic intelligence assets. The Ukrainian defense industry should increase the production of Bukovel-AD electronic warfare systems in the country or abroad. The role of artillery and missile weapons remains high in this war, accounting for 60 to 80% of all enemy fire damage.
The introduction of high-precision weapons has made it possible to inflict serious losses on enemy artillery in the course of counter-battery warfare over the past year. However, the effectiveness of precision weapons, such as Excalibur missiles that use GPS guidance, has declined sharply due to improvements in Russian electronic warfare. Meanwhile, Russia's own counter-battery fire has improved.
This was largely made possible by the use of Lancet drones, which, in cooperation with reconnaissance drones, are targeting the Ukrainian artillery. "For now, we have managed to achieve parity with Russia by having less and more accurate firepower. But this cannot last.
We need to establish our local GPS fields - using ground-based antennas, not just satellites - to make our precision-guided projectiles more accurate in the face of Russian electronic warfare. We need to make greater use of kamikaze drones to strike Russian artillery. And we need our partners to send us better artillery reconnaissance equipment that can detect Russian weapons," Zaluzhny said.
As of February 24, 2022, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had a limited set of forces designed to cut through minefields. They were armed with technically outdated equipment. Thanks to the Western partners, the military operations managed to somewhat increase the capacity of engineering units to make passages, but given the unprecedented scale of these barriers, even such capabilities are objectively insufficient.
To expand the capabilities of Ukrainian demining units, it is proposed to introduce the use of sensors based on LiDAR technology to detect mines, as well as smoke barrier systems to hide the work of sappers from enemy reconnaissance and destruction means. In addition, it is suggested to introduce the use of decommissioned jet engines, water cannons, and cluster artillery to make passages in minefields. The Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is constantly working to improve the procedure for establishing and training reserves.
Despite this, some issues remain problematic, in particular, limited opportunities to train reserves on the own territory, as the enemy is able to launch missile and air strikes on training centers and training grounds. The prolonged nature of the war, limited opportunities for rotation of military personnel on the front line, and loopholes in the law that allow for seemingly legal evasion of mobilization significantly reduce the motivation of citizens to perform military service. To solve these problems, Ukraine should be introducing the "Oberih" Unified State Register of Conscripts, Persons Liable for Military Service and Reservists into the activities of military administration facilities and develop an automated system for monitoring and recording the preparation of Ukrainian citizens for military service.
The list of categories of Ukrainian citizens who are trained for military service and national resistance should be expanded, and the practice of combat training should be introduced.