Operation in Kursk Oblast allows Ukraine to seize initiative in one section of front line – ISW

Experts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) have pointed out that the Ukrainian offensive in Russia's Kursk Oblast allowed the Ukrainian defence forces to seize the initiative in one section of the front at least temporarily and continue the confrontation throughout the entire area of combat actions. Source: ISW Quote: "Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast has allowed Ukrainian forces to at least temporarily seize the battlefield initiative in one area of the frontline and contest Russia's theatre-wide initiative."

Details: The experts have highlighted that since November 2023, Russia's sustained initiative across the entire zone of combat actions has allowed it to set the terms of engagement, including the location, timing, and intensity of military actions in Ukraine.

This dominance has compelled Ukraine to focus its resources on reactive and defensive strategies. Nonetheless, Ukraine's operation in Russia's Kursk Oblast disrupted this dynamic, forcing the Kremlin and Russian military leadership to react by redeploying troops and resources to counter the Ukrainian advance in that region. Despite this, Russian forces refrained from launching direct offensives in Kursk Oblast.

Instead, Russia leveraged its overarching strategic advantage to maintain pressure on Ukraine, seeking to inhibit Ukrainian forces from consolidating manpower and equipment for potential counter-offensives. At the same time, Russia orchestrated a controlled pace of warfare that ensured its ability to sustain successive offensives.

Quote: "Russian leader Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command likely incorrectly assessed that Ukraine lacked the capability to contest the initiative, and Ukraine's ability to achieve operational surprise and contest the theatre-wide initiative is challenging the operational and strategic assumptions underpinning current Russian offensive efforts in Ukraine." "The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast and further possible Ukrainian cross-border incursions force a decision point on the Kremlin and the Russian military command about whether to view the thousand-kilometre-long international border with Ukraine's north-east as a legitimate frontline that Russia must defend instead of a dormant area of the theatre as they have treated it since Fall 2022."

Details: The experts have also suggested that Moscow's response may force Russian military commanders to integrate border security needs into their overall theatre-wide campaign strategy. This adjustment could introduce new, long-term limitations on Russia's operational planning that it has not previously had to contend with. They also observed that Russia's approach of treating the international border as a "dormant front" has provided it with increased flexibility in ammassing and deploying both human and material resources for its operations in Ukraine.

While Russia has invested heavily in constructing fortifications along the international border, it has not sufficiently allocated the necessary personnel and equipment to effectively man and defend these defences.

To quote the ISW's Key Takeaways on 11 August:

• Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast has allowed Ukrainian forces to at least temporarily seize the battlefield initiative in one area of the frontline and contest Russia's theatre-wide initiative.
• The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast and further possible Ukrainian cross-border incursions force a decision point on the Kremlin and the Russian military command about whether to view the thousand-kilometre-long international border with northeastern Ukraine as a legitimate frontline that Russia must defend instead of a dormant area of the theatre as they have treated it since the autumn of 2022.

  Moscow's response may require the Russian military command to consider the manpower and materiel requirements for defending the international border as part of its theatre-wide campaign design and can therefore impose long-term operational planning constraints that Russia previously did not face.

• Geolocated footage and Russian and Ukrainian reporting from 10 and 11 August indicate that Ukrainian forces advanced westward and northwestward in Kursk Oblast, although Russian sources largely claimed that Russian forces have stabilised the situation.
• The hastily assembled and disparate Russian force grouping responding to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast is comprised of Russian units likely below their doctrinal end-strength and ill-prepared to establish the joint command and control (C2) structures necessary to coordinate operations.
• Russia's redeployment of battalion and lower-level units rather than full brigades and regiments to defend in Kursk Oblast is likely contributing to Russian forces' difficulty in quickly establishing effective C2 in the area.
• Confusion about the status of Russian conscripts fighting in Kursk Oblast is a consequence of ineffective C2 and will likely continue to further strain Russia's C2 structures to respond to the Kursk operation.
• Russian officials acknowledged that Ukrainian mobile groups advanced upwards of 25 kilometres into Belaya district, Kursk Oblast, on the night of 10-11 August, but there are no indications that these groups remain in the area or that Ukrainian forces are operating beyond the immediate border area in Belaya district.
• The reported rapid Ukrainian manoeuvre in Belaya districts suggests that Russian forces along the international border remain poorly prepared to respond to further Ukrainian cross-border incursions.
• Russian sources claimed on 11 August that small Ukrainian groups attempted unsuccessful limited cross-border incursions into western Belgorod Oblast.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy officially acknowledged the Ukrainian cross-border incursion into Kursk Oblast for the first time on 10 August.
• A top Ukrainian defence official reportedly stated that Russian forces have somewhat reduced the intensity of assaults in eastern Ukraine but that otherwise the situation remains largely unchanged amid the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast, which is consistent with ISW's observations of Russian offensive tempo across the theatre.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupiansk and Donetsk City.
• Russian propagandists are attempting to use the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast to promote Russian force generation efforts.

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